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Abstract. Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500
B.C.. With the rise of Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and
are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to ad-
dress the various security requirements of these electronic transactions. We pro-
pose a formal framework to analyze and verify security properties of e-Auction
protocols. We model protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus and define privacy
notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-
freeness and coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and
non-cancellation. Additionally we show on two case studies how these properties
can be verified automatically using ProVerif, and discover several attacks.
1 Introduction
Auctions are a simple method to sell goods and services. Typically a seller offers a good
or a service, and the bidders make offers. Depending on the type of auction, the offers
might be sent using sealed envelopes which are opened at the same time to determine
the winner (the “sealed-bid” auction), or an auctioneer could announce prices decreas-
ingly until one bidder is willing to pay the announced price (the “dutch auction”). Ad-
ditionally there might be several rounds, or offers might be announced publicly directly
(the “English” or “shout-out” auction). The winner usually is the bidder submitting the
highest bid, but in some cases he might only have to pay the second highest offer as a
price (the “second-price”- or “Vickrey”-Auction). In general a bidder wants to win the
auction at the lowest possible price, and the seller wants to sell his good at the highest
possible price. For more information on different auction methods see [1].
Depending on the type of auction and the application different security properties
might be interesting to realize in an auction protocol and have been discussed in the
literature. We identify the following main security properties of auction protocols:
– Fairness: We propose the three following fairness properties: Firstly a fair auction
protocol should not leak any information about the other participants and their of-
fers until the bidding phase is over (so as to prohibit unfair tactics based on leaked
information). We call this Weak or Strong Noninterference, depending on if the
number of bidders is leaked or not. Thirdly a protocol should not allow anybody
to win although they did not submit the highest price, i.e. ensure that the Highest
Price Wins. Otherwise a losing bidder could try to cheat to win.
? The original publication is available on www.springerlink.com
– Authentication: For the seller it is crucial to ensure Non-Repudiation, i.e. that – af-
ter the winner has been announced – the winning bidder cannot claim that he did not
submit the winning bid. Additionally we might want to ensure Non-Cancellation,
i.e. that a bidder cannot cancel a submitted offer before the winner is announced, to
have binding bids.
– Privacy: We distinguish several different notions: Secrecy of Bids, Anonymity of
Bidders, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. Secrecy of Bids guarantees
that the losing bids remain secret, or at least cannot be linked to the participants.
Anonymity of Bidders means that the participants, in particular the winner, remain
anonymous. Privacy is important in sealed-bid auctions to also prevent information
leakage after the auction is over, for example if an auction is organized in several
rounds. Receipt-Freeness ensures that bidders are unable to prove to an attacker
(which might be another bidder trying to force them to submit a low bid so that he
wins) that they bid a certain offer, and Coercion-Resistance means that even when
interacting with a coercer, the bidders can still bid a price of their choice.
– Verifiability: A verifiable protocol should allow the bidders to verify that the win-
ner was correctly determined, in particular if they lost. Additionally it might be
desirable to give the bidders the ability to contest if they think that their offers were
not taken into account correctly. We do not consider verifiability in this paper.
Related Work: Many electronic auction (e-Auction) protocols have been proposed
in the literature (see e.g. [2–5] for an overview). As case studies, we use the protocol
by Curtis et al. [6], which uses a trusted registrar and pseudonyms, and the protocol by
Brandt [3], which is entirely distributed using secure multi-party computation.
The different security properties have been discussed since the early publications on
e-Auctions, e.g. Franklin and Reiter [7] discuss secrecy of bids, anonymity of bidders,
fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Further publications [8–11] have used
and refined these notions, also adding verifiability. Abe and Suzuki [12] introduced and
motivated Receipt-Freeness for e-Auctions. Cancellation of bids was also discussed by
Stubblebine and Syverson [13] who proposed a protocol implementing cancellation as
a feature, and another protocol ensuring non-cancellation. Still, all definitions given in
these papers are informal.
Although there has been much work on developing auction protocols and discussing
properties, there is considerably less work on their formal definition and analysis. Sub-
ramanian [14] proposed an auction protocol and analyzed it using a BAN-style logic to
show some security properties. In particular he showed the atomicity of the transaction,
weak secrecy of private keys and a form of anonymity modeled as weak secrecy of the
public key of the bidder. More recently Dong et al. [15] analyzed a receipt-free auction
protocol in the Applied pi-Calculus. They only considered privacy, in particular secrecy
of the bidding price and receipt-freeness, but only for losing bidders. Verifiability and
accountability was formalized by Kuesters et al. [16].
In the context of electronic voting there has been much more work on formal veri-
fication, in particular in the area of privacy [17–23]. Some notions are similar, yet there
are some fundamental differences to auctions: In the case of voting the published re-
sult is the sum of all votes, hence there is a certain leakage of information about all
voters. For example if a candidate received no votes at all, this increases the attackers
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knowledge about the voters’ votes as he can exclude this previously possible option.
Yet ideally there should always be some uncertainty about the votes, i.e. no voter’s pri-
vacy should entirely compromised (apart from pathological cases such as an unanimous
vote). In the case of auctions, the public outcome is the winning bid(der), who loses all
privacy. In some cases he might stay anonymous, e.g. the well known “bidder on the
phone”, but at least the winning price will be public. The other bid(der)s however can
remain completely private/anonymous – we only know that the offers are inferior. Fair-
ness also is a requirement in electronic voting as well as e-Auctions, but properties such
as Non-Repudiation and Non-Cancellation are specific to e-Auctions.
There has been a lot of work on Non-Repudiation in the context of contract signing
protocols (e.g. [24, 25]). We rely on the work by Klay et al. [24] who propose many
different flavors of non-repudiation based on agent knowledge or authentication. We
only consider “Non-Repudiation of Origin”, i.e. that the bidder cannot deny that he
made an offer, implemented as a form of authentication.
Contributions: We provide the following main contributions: i) We give a formal
framework in the Applied pi-Calculus [26] to model and analyze e-Auction protocols. ii)
We define the discussed fairness, privacy and authentication properties in our model and
analyze their relationship. iii) We provide two case studies: The protocol by Curtis et
al. [6] and a protocol by Brandt [3]. We show how both can be modeled in the Applied
pi-Calculus and verified using Proverif [27–29]. We discover several flaws on these
protocols and explain how some of their shortcomings can be addressed. Due to the
space limitations we cannot give the full proofs here, they are available in [30], and the
ProVerif code used in the case studies is available in [31].
Outline: In Section 2, we recall the Applied pi-Calculus and model auction proto-
cols. In Section 3, we formally define the security properties. In Section 4, we analyze
two protocols in our model before concluding in the last section.
2 Preliminaries
We recall the Applied pi-Calculus and introduce our model of auction protocols.
2.1 Applied pi-Calculus
The Applied pi-Calculus [26] is a formal language to describe concurrent processes.
The calculus consists of names (which typically correspond to data or channels), vari-
ables, and a signature Σ of function symbols which can be used to build terms. Func-
tions typically include encryption and decryption – for example enc(message, key),
dec(message, key) – hashing, signing etc. Terms are correct (i.e. respecting arity and
sorts) combinations of names and functions. We distinguish the type “channel” from
other base types. To model equalities we use an equational theory E which defines a
relation =E . A classical example which describes the correctness of symmetric encryp-
tion is dec(enc(message, key), key) =E message. Processes are constructed using
the grammars detailed in Figure 1.
The substitution {M/x} replaces the variable x with term M . We denote by fv(A),
bv(A), fn(A), bn(A) the free variables, bound variables, free names or bound names
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P , Q, R := plain processes
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction (“new”)
ifM = N then P conditional
else Q
in(u, x).P message input
out(u, x).P message output
(a) Plain process
A, B, C := active processes
P plain process
A|B parallel composition
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
(b) Extended process
Fig. 1: Grammars for plain and extended or active processes
respectively. A process is closed if all variables are bound or defined by an active sub-
stitution. The frame Φ(A) of an active process A is obtained by replacing all plain
processes in A by 0. This frame can be seen as a representation of what is statically
known to the exterior about a process. The domain dom(Φ) of a frame Φ is the set of
variables for which Φ defines a substitution. An evaluation context C[ ] denotes an ac-
tive process with a hole for an active process that is not under replication, a conditional,
an input or an output. In the rest of the paper we use the following usual notions of
equivalence and bisimilarity based on the original semantics [26].
Definition 1. Two termsM andN are equal in the frame φ, written (M = N)φ, if and
only if φ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ, and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for some names n˜
and some substitution σ.
Definition 2. Two closed frames φ and ψ are statically equivalent, written φ ≈s ψ,
when dom(φ) = dom(ψ) and when for all terms M and N we have (M = N)φ if
and only if (M = N)ψ. Two extended processes A and B are statically equivalent
(A ≈s B) if their frames are statically equivalent.
The intuition is that two processes are statically equivalent if the messages exchanged
with the environment cannot be distinguished by an attacker (i.e. all operations on both
sides give the same results). This idea can be extended to labeled bisimilarity.
Definition 3. Labeled bisimilarity is the largest symmetric relationR on closed active
processes, such that A R B implies: i) A ≈s B, ii) if A → A′, then B →∗ B′ and
A′ R B′ for some B′, iii) if A α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅,
then B →∗ α−→→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′.
In this case each interaction on one side can be simulated by the other side, and the
processes are statically equivalent at each step during the execution, thus an attacker
cannot distinguish both sides.
2.2 Modeling Auction Protocols
We model auction protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus as follows.
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Definition 4. An auction protocol is defined by a tuple (B, S, A1, . . . , Am, n˜) where
B is the process that is executed by the bidders, S is the process executed by the seller,
and the Aj’s are the processes executed by the authorities (for example an auctioneer,
a registrar etc.), and n˜ is a set of private channels. We also assume the existence of a
particular public channel res that is only used to publish the winning bid(der).
Note that we have only one process for the bidders. This means that different bidders
will execute the same process, but with different variable values (e.g. the keys, the bids
etc.). To reason about privacy, we talk about instances of an auction protocol, which we
call auction processes.
Definition 5. An instance of an auction protocol (B, S, A1, . . ., Am, n˜) is called an
auction process, which is a closed process νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1 | . . . |Bσidkσbk |S|A1| . . . |Al),
where l ≤ m, n˜′ includes the secret channel names n˜, Bσidiσbi are the processes exe-
cuted by the k bidders, σidi is a substitution assigning the identity to the i-th bidder
1,
σbi specifies the i-th bid and Aj’s are the auction authorities which are required to be
honest. In our definitions we use the context AP ′[·] which allows us to reason about
bidders inside the auction process AP , for example if we want to explicit bidders l and
o, we rewrite AP as AP ′[Bσidlσbl |Bσidoσbo ].
The restricted channel names model private channels. Note that we only model the
honest authorities as unspecified parties are subsumed by the attacker.
By abuse of notation we write bl > bo to express that the bidding price determined
by the substitution σbl is greater than the one assigned by σbo , and maxi{bi} denotes
the maximal price assigned by any substitution σbi .
In order to reason about reachability and authentication properties we will use
events. Events are annotations, hence we extend the above plain process grammar as
follows: P = event e(M1, . . . ,Mn).P where e is the name of the event, and the terms
M1, . . . ,Mn are parameters. These events do not change the behavior of the processes,
but allow us to verify properties such as “event bad is unreachable” or “on every trace
event a is preceded by event b”. We use the following events: bid(p,id): When a
bidder id bids the price p the event bid(p,id) is emitted. recBid(p,id): When
a bid at price p by bidder id is recorded by the auctioneer/bulletin board2/etc. the event
recBid(p,id) is called. This will be used to model Non-Cancellation, i.e. from this
point on a bid is considered binding. won(p,id): When a bidder id wins the auction
at price p, the event won(p,id) is emitted.
We use the following transformation introduced in [18] that turns a process P into
another process P ch that reveals all its inputs and secret data on the channel ch.
Definition 6. Let P be a plain process and ch be a channel name. P ch is defined by:
– 0ch =ˆ 0,
– (P |Q)ch =ˆ P ch|Qch,
– (νn.P )ch =ˆ νn.out(ch, n).P ch if n is a name of base type, (νn.P )ch =ˆ νn.P ch
otherwise,
1 This determines for example the secret keys.
2 A bulletin board is a central append-only noticeboard that is often used for communication in
protocols.
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– (in(u, x).P )ch =ˆ in(u, x).out(ch, x).P ch if x is a variable of base type,
(in(u, x).P )ch =ˆ in(u, x).P ch otherwise,
– (out(u,M).P )ch =ˆ out(u,M).P ch,
– (ifM = N then P else Q)ch =ˆ ifM = N then P ch else Qch.
– (!P )ch =ˆ !P ch,
In the remainder we assume that ch /∈ fn(P )∪ bn(P ) before applying the transforma-
tion. We need another transformation of [18] that does not only reveal the secret data,
but also takes orders from an outsider before sending a message or branching. This
models a completely corrupted party.
Definition 7. Let P be a plain process and c1, c2 be channel names. P c1,c2 is defined
as follows:
– 0c1,c2 =ˆ 0,
– (P |Q)c1,c2 =ˆ P c1,c2 |Qc1,c2 ,
– (νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ νn.out(c1, n).P c1,c2 if n is a name of base type, (νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ
νn.P c1,c2 otherwise,
– (in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(u, x).out(c1, x).P c1,c2 if x is a variable of base type,
(in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(u, x).P c1,c2 otherwise,
– (out(u,M).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).out(u, x).P c1,c2 where x is a fresh variable,
– (!P )c1,c2 =ˆ !P c1,c2 ,
– (ifM = N thenP elseQ)c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).if x = true thenP c1,c2 elseQc1,c2
where x is a fresh variable and true is a constant.
To hide the output of a process, we use the following definition of [18].
Definition 8. LetA be an extended process,A\out(ch,·) is defined by νch.(A|!in(ch, x)).
3 Security Requirenments
3.1 Fairness Properties
A fair auction protocol should not leak any information about any participant until the
bidding phase is over and the winning bid is announced, and hence some information
is inevitably leaked. We propose the following two definitions:
Definition 9. An auction protocol ensures Strong Noninterference (SN) if for any two
auction processes APA and APB that halt at the end of the bidding phase (i.e. where
we remove all code after the last recBid event) we have APA ≈l APB .
This notion is very strong: Any two instances, independently of the participants and
their offers, are required to be bisimilar until the end of the bidding phase. This would
also require two instances with a different number of participants to be bisimilar, which
will probably not hold on many protocols. A more realistic notion is the following:
Definition 10. An auction protocol ensures Weak Noninterference (WN) if for any two
auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and
APB = νn˜
′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) that halt at the end of
the bidding phase (i.e. where we remove all code after the last recBid event) we have
APA ≈l APB .
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This only requires any two instances with the same participants Bσidi to be bisimilar,
however bids may still change. It is easy to see that (SN) implies (WN).
Another important fairness property is that there is no strategy that allows a mali-
cious participant to win the auction at a chosen price, independently of the other bids.
Definition 11. An auction protocol ensures Highest Price Wins (HPW) if for any auc-
tion process AP we have for AP ′[BσidAσbA | (BσidBσbB )c1,c2 ] where bA is the high-
est bid, there is no trace containing the event won for bidder idB with a lower bid.
The idea is the following: We have an honest bidder BσidA who submits the highest
bid. The attacker has completely corrupted another bidder BσidB and should be unable
to win the auction on his behalf on a lower bid.
Note that these definitions can be applied independently of trust assumptions, and
that different assumptions can lead to different results: For example, a protocol might
ensure (HPW) if the auctioneer is trusted, but not otherwise.
3.2 Authentication Properties
The first authentication property we want to define is Non-Repudiation, i.e. that – once
the winner has been announced – a winning bidder cannot claim that the winning bid
was not send by him. As discussed in [24], Non-Repudiation can be expressed as form
of authentication.
Definition 12. An auction protocol ensures the property of Non-Repudiation (NR) if
for every auction process AP on every possible execution trace the event won(p,id)
is preceded by a corresponding event bid(p,id).
The intuition is simple: If there was a trace on which a bidder would win without sub-
mitting the winning bid, he could try to claim that he did not submit the winning bid
even in a case where he rightfully won.
Note two subtleties with this definition: Firstly, since only honest parties are explic-
itly modeled, it is clear that only honest parties can emit events. Hence one could think
that our definition implicitly assumes some parties to be honest – however, this is not
the case: If we do not trust the party that would normally emit for example the event
won, we can simply remove this party from the model and replace it with a new party
that receives the parameters on a special channel, and then emits the event using these
parameters. This gives the adversary total control about the events, as it would be the
case for a distrusted authority. Secondly we need to have session-dependent identifiers
for the bidders in our events. This is to ensure that the protocol only accepts bids that
were submitted in a the same instance, and that an attacker cannot submit a bid from a
different session.
The second authentication property we model is Non-Cancellation, i.e. that a bidder
cannot cancel a submitted bid before the winner is announced.
Definition 13. An auction protocol ensures the property of Non-Cancellation (NC) if
for any auction process AP which contains a bidder (Bσidiσbi)
chc, i.e. a bidder which
reveals his secret data on channel chc (see Def. 6), and which submits the highest bid,
i.e. ∀j 6= i : bi > bj , there is no trace containing the events recBid(b i,id i) and
won(b w,id w) for another, lower bid, i.e. bw < bi.
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The idea is the following: The bidder idi submits the highest bid, so he should win. If
however there is the possibility that even though his bid was correctly received he did
not win, this would mean that the intruder was able to cancel the bidder’s bid even after
reception. We require the bidder to reveal all his secret data to the intruder to capture
the fact that the bidder himself might want to cancel his offer, in which case he could
use his private data (keys etc.) to do so.
Note that technically we only defined Non-Cancellation for the winning bidder. This
is sufficient since in a first-price auction the other bids do not influence the outcome.
Additionally it can be generalized to other auction types by simply requiring that the
winning price must be correct on all traces. This is to ensure that no other bids that
influence the result can be canceled.
Both properties are independent: A protocol may implement the cancellation of
bids as an official feature, for example after all bids have been submitted, bidders could
be allowed to cancel their bids for a certain period of time, before the winner is finally
announced. At the same time, such a protocol may ensure non-repudiation of the winner
using e.g. signatures. Similarly a protocol may ensure Non-Cancellation but no Non-
Repudiation if the submitted bids cannot be canceled, but are not authenticated, so
that the winner can successfully claim not having submitted the winning bid. Again, a
protocol might ensure Non-Cancellation or Non-Repudiation for a certain trust setting,
but not for another.
3.3 Privacy Properties
BPU WA
SASBPS[15] P
SRF[15]
FPSBA
RF-U RF-WA
RF-SARF-BPS RF
FPSBA
CR-U CR-WA
CR-SACR-BPS CR
FPSBA
Fig. 2: Relations among the privacy notions. A C−→
B means that under the assumption C a protocol
ensuring A also ensures B.
We consider Privacy, Receipt-
Freeness and Coercion-Resistance,
and at each level two indepen-
dent axes: i) the winner may stay
anonymous or not, ii) the bids
may stay completely private or
there might be list of all bids,
which are however unlinkable to
the bidders.
These definitions are expressed
for protocols implementing a first-
price sealed-bid auction. We also
provide the generalized notions
(P), (RF) and (CR), which can
also be applied to other types
of auctions such as second-price
auctions. We show that if a pro-
tocol correctly implements a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSBA), these notions
coincide with the corresponding Strong Anonymity-notions (SA), (RF-SA) and (CR-
SA). Figure 2 provides an overview of the different notions.
Privacy. The first privacy notion we consider was proposed by Dong et al. [15].
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Definition 14. An electronic auction protocol ensures Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy
(SBPS) if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
The intuition is the following: If the losing bids are private, a losing bidder may change
his bid for another losing one without this being noticeable to an attacker. This is ex-
pressed as an observational equivalence between two situations where a losing bidder
changes his bid. Note that BσidC does not necessarily win since in AP
′ there might be
a bidder offering a higher price, but bA, bB < bC guarantees that BσidA loses.
We propose the following, weaker notion of Bidding-Price Unlinkability, which
allows the losing bids to be public, however their link to the bidders have to be secret.
Definition 15. An e-Auction protocol ensures Bidding-Price Unlinkability (BPU) if for
an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
In this definition we require two situations in which two losing bidders swap their bids
to be bisimilar. This might be the case if the bids are public, but the real identity of the
bidders is hidden, e.g. through the use of pseudonyms.
Note that the previous two notions only concern the losing bids, yet we might also
want to preserve the anonymity of the winning bidder.
Definition 16. An electronic auction protocol ensures Strong Anonymity (SA) if for an
auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
Here we require two situations to be bisimilar where two different bidders win using
the same offer, and the losing bidders may also use different bids in the two cases. This
is stronger than Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS).
A slightly weaker notion is Weak Anonymity, which allows the bids to be public,
however their link to the bidders have to be secret, even for the winner.
Definition 17. An electronic auction protocol ensures Weak Anonymity (WA) if for an
auction process AP and any bids bA ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbA ]
Here again two different bidders win using the same bid, but the losing bidder cannot
choose his bid freely as above - the two bidders swap their bids. This corresponds
for example to a situation with a public list of bids in clear, but where it is private
which bidder submitted which bid. Weak Anonymity (WA) is stronger than Bidding-
Price Unlinkability (BPU) as even the winner remains anonymous. All these definitions
are only meaningful for first-price auctions. To also deal with second-prices sealed-bid
auctions, we can use the following generalization based on the published result.
Definition 18. Let P |c = νc˜h.P where c˜h are all channels except for c, i.e. we hide all
channels except for c.
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Definition 19. An electronic auction protocol ensures Privacy (P) if for any two auction
processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) we have
AP1|res ≈l AP2|res ⇒ AP1 ≈l AP2
The intuition is quite simple: any two instances (consisting of the same bidders) which
give the same result, i.e. the same winning bid, have to be bisimilar.
It turns out that for a correct first-price sealed-bid auction protocol which only pub-
lishes the winning price, this coincides with Strong Anonymity.
Definition 20. An electronic auction protocol implements a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auc-
tion (FPSBA) if for any auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A
| S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al)
we have
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇔ max
i
bi,A = max
i
bi,B
This definition requires the protocol to announce the same result if and only if the max-
imum among the submitted bids is the same, independently of which bidder submitted
which bid. It is easy to see that this is true in the case of a correct first-price sealed-bid
auction protocol. This allows us to prove the equivalence of (P) and (SA).
Theorem 1. If an electronic auction protocol implements a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auc-
tion (FPSBA), then Privacy (P) and Strong Anonymity (SA) are equivalent.
Proof. Sketch: Assume we have two instances that give the same result, by (FPSBA)
they have the same maximal bid. This bid may have been submitted by another bidder,
and the other bids might have changed, butAP1 ≈l AP2 can be proved using successive
applications of (SA). Similarly if we assume two instances as in the definition of (SA),
it is easy to see that they have the same maximal offer. Hence the result will be the
same, and we can apply (P) to conclude. uunionsq
Receipt-Freeness. A first Receipt-Freeness definition for auction protocols was pro-
posed by Dong et al. [15]. It is a generalization of Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS).
Definition 21. An electronic auction protocol ensures Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF)
if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC there exists a process B′ such
that B′\out(chc,·) ≈l BσidAσbB and
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc |BσidCσbC
]
≈l AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]
The intuition behind this definition is a follows: If the protocol is receipt-free, an at-
tacker cannot distinguish between a situation where a losing bidder bids bA and reveals
all his secret data on a channel chc, and a situation where the bidder bids bB and only
pretends to reveal his secret data (the fake strategy, modeled by process B′). Note that
Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF) implies Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS).
This definition has several shortcomings: Firstly, it ensures receipt-freeness only for
one losing bidder, whereas in reality several bidders might be under attack. Secondly, it
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does not necessary ensures the privacy of other bidders: Consider for example a proto-
col that allows a losing bidder to create a fake receipt for himself (e.g. using a trapdoor
to generate a different decryption key), and that reveals all submitted bids to the partic-
ipating bidders (e.g. to enable verifiability). Such a protocol would be secure according
to above definition, but it would imply that a coercer can ask to a bidder to reveal the
other participants bids, violating their privacy. To address these issues, we propose the
following notions, inspired by some definitions developed for electronic voting [20] and
the above privacy notions.
Definition 22. An electronic auction protocol ensures RF-XXX if for any two auction
processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
– if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price-Secrecy), there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B =maxi bi,A
= maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
– if XXX=U (Unlinkability), there exists j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j −
1, j + 1, . . . k},
– if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity), maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂
{1, . . . , k},
– if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity), there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B =
bΠ(i),A, and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Consider the first case, (RF-BPS): In this definition any subset of losing bidders may
create fake receipts at the same time, and the other bidders can also change their bids.
It is easy to see that this definition implies Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF).
Similarly to our privacy definitions, we can also weaken (RF-BPS) and only con-
sider cases where the bids are merely unlinkable to the bidders, by only considering
permutations of the bids: We obtain (RF-U).
The third notion (RF-SA) is stronger in the sense that we also allow the winning
bidder to be under attack, i.e. a winner needs to be able to create a fake receipt that
proves that he lost, and a losing bidder needs to be able to create a fake receipt that
proves that he won. Note that an attacker might ask a losing bidder to prove that he bid
a certain price before the auction is over. If the bidder decides to bid less and create
a fake receipt, the attacker may notice that he got a fake receipt if for example the
winning bid is less than the price on the receipt. This is however an inherent problem
of auctions, but our definition guarantees that a losing bidder can create a fake receipt
for the winning price once the auction is over and the winning price is known.
Again, we can define a weaker version where the list of prices may be public, but it
has to be unlinkable to the bidders, even for the winner: (RF-WA). It is easy to see that
(RF-SA) implies (RF-BPS) and (RF-WA), and that both (RF-BPS) and (RF-WA) imply
(RF-U). Note that this definition implicitly assumes that all bidders not under attack are
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honest. If one also wants to consider corrupted bidders, this can be modeled by replacing
some of the honest bidders Bσidiσbi,X by corrupted bidders (Bσidiσbi,X )
ci1,c
i
2 .
Finally, the following definition is a generalization of Receipt-Free Strong Anony-
mity (RF-SA) (analogous to (P) and (SA)): Any two instance giving the same result
have to be bisimilar, even if bidders are under attack.
Definition 23. A auction protocol ensures Receipt-Freeness (RF) if for any two auction
processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
.
Similarly to Privacy (P), we prove that for protocols implementing a First-Price Sealed-
Bid Auction (First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction), Receipt-Free Strong Anonymity (RF-
SA) and Receipt-Freeness coincide.
Coercion-Resistance. Coercion-Resistance is a stronger property than receipt-freeness:
The intruder may not only ask for a receipt, but is also allowed to interact with the bid-
der during the bidding process and to give orders. We can generalize the previously
discussed Receipt-Freeness notions to Coercion-Resistance as follows.
Definition 24. An electronic auction protocol ensures CR-XXX if for any two auction
processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
– if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price Secrecy): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B =maxi bi,A
= maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
– if XXX=U (Unlinkability): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B =maxi bi,A =maxi bi,B
and there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A and for any subset
I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
– if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity): maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂
{1, . . . , k},
– if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity): there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B =
bΠ(i),A and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.( |Pi),
n˜∩ fn(C) = ∅ and AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
The difference to the previous receipt-freeness definitions is that the attacked bidders do
not only reveal their data on channel c1, but also take orders on channel c2. The context
Ci models the attacker that tries to force them to bid the price bi,A (this is expressed by
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the condition on Ci). The protocol is hence coercion-resistant if there exists a counter-
strategy B′ which allow the bidders to bid bi,B instead without the attacker noticing.
For non sealed-bid first-price auction, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 25. An auction protocol ensures Coercion-Resistance (CR) if for any two
auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al)
and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset
I ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, there exists processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with
Ci = νc1.νc2.( |Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
Again we can prove that for protocols implementing a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
(FPSBA), Coercion-Resistant Strong Anonymity (CR-SA) and Coercion-Resistance
(CR) coincide.
4 Case Studies
We applied the previously explained definitions on two case studies using ProVerif [27–
29]: the protocol by Curtis et al. [6], and the protocol by Protocol by Brandt [3].
4.1 Protocol by Curtis, Pierprzyk and Seruga [6]
The protocol by Curtis et al. [6] was designed to support sealed-bid first- and second
price auctions while guaranteeing fairness, privacy, verifiability and non-repudiation.
Informal Description. The main idea of the protocol is the following: The bidders
register with a trusted Registration Authority (RA) using a Public-Key Infrastructure
(PKI), which issues pseudonyms that will then be used for submitting bids to the Seller
(S). It is split into three phases: Registration, Bidding, and Winner determination.
– Registration: Each bidder sends his identity, a hash of his bidding price bi and a
signature of h(bi) to the RA. The RA checks the identity and the signature using
the PKI, and replies with an encrypted (using the bidder’s public key) and signed
message containing a newly generated pseudonym p and the hashed bid h(bi).
– Bidding: The RA generates a new symmetric key k. Each bidder will send c =
EncpkS (bi), his bid bi encrypted with the seller’s public key, and a signature of c,
together with his pseudonym to the RA. The RA will reply with a signature on c,
and encrypts the bidders message, together with the hashed bid h(bi) from phase
one, using the symmetric key k. This encrypted message is then send to the seller.
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– Winner determination: After all bids have been submitted, the RA will reveal the
symmetric key k to the seller. The seller can then decrypt the bids, verify the cor-
rectness of the hash and determine the winner. To identify the winner using the
pseudonym he can ask the RA to reveal the true identity.
Formal Model. We modeled the protocol in ProVerif using a standard equational
theory for symmetric encryption (functions senc and sdec), asymmetric encryption
(functions enc, dec and pubkey – which generates the public key corresponding to
a secret key) and signatures (functions sign, checksign and getmessage):
sdec(senc(m, key), key) = m
dec(enc(m, pubkey(sk)), sk) = m
checksign(sign(m, sk), pubkey(sk)) = m
getmessage(sign(m, sk)) = m
Due to space limitations we cannot include the full model here, the ProVerif code is
available on our website [31].
Analysis. We assume a honest RA and an honest seller.
Non-Repudiation (NR): To prove (NR), we have to show that on each possible trace
the event won(p,id) is preceded by the event bid(p,id). ProVerif can verify such
properties using queries, in this case using the query
query p:price,id:identity;
event(won(p,id)) ==> event(bid(p,id)).
This query means that for any value p of type price and any id of type identity, if
the event won(p,id) is recorded, it is preceded by the event bid(p,id). ProVerif
finds the following attack: Since the channel between the Registration Authority and
the Seller is not protected, anybody can pretend to be the RA and submit false bids,
encrypted with a self-chosen symmetric key. After all false bids are submitted, the at-
tacker reveals the symmetric key and the seller will decrypt the bogus bids. Hence the
event won(p,id) can be emitted on a trace without any event bid(p,id). We pro-
pose a solution to address this problem: If the messages from the RA to the seller are
signed, the attacker cannot impersonate RA any more and ProVerif is able to prove
Non-Repudiation for the accordingly modified protocol.
Non-Cancellation (NC): Here we have to show that even if a bidder reveals his secret
data to the intruder, the intruder cannot cancel a submitted bid, i.e. there is no trace
with the events recBid(p 1,id a) and won(p 2,id b) where p 1 > p 2. To
verify this we need to model at least two distinct prices, which can be implemented
using constants, i.e. by setting p 1 = max price and p 2 = smaller price,
where max price and smaller price are two constants such that max price >
smaller price3. Then we want to test the conjunction (not the precedence as above)
3 Note that most auction protocols assume a finite number of possible prices anyway, which we
can model using a list of constants.
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of two events, which is not possible directly in ProVerif. A well-known solution is to
replace the underlying events with messages over a private channel to a newly added
processes which will call a conjunction event recBid and won once he received all
the messages. Then we can use the following query:
query event(recBid and won(max price, id a,
smaller price, id b)).
where the first two parameters are from the event recBid(p 1,id a) and the second
from the event won(p 2,id b), here instantiated with price constants as explained
above and two constants for two different bidders. For the original protocol, ProVerif
finds a similar attack to the one described above: An attacker can delete the messages
sent by the the RA to the seller, and choose a symmetric key and send bogus messages
containing prices of his choice instead. When he reveals the symmetric key, a bidder of
his choice will win, hence there will be an event won(smaller price,id b) for
a smaller price than the one recorded by recBid(max price,id a). Even if we
add signatures as proposed above, ProVerif still comes up with an attack: A dishonest
bidder might submit a first bid triggering the event recBid for this bid, delete the
forwarded message to the seller, and then submit a second bid at a different price. A
first attempt to fix this issue would be – as proposed in the original paper – by including
the number of bids in the message where the RA reveals the symmetric key. This would
allow the seller to verify if he received the correct number of bids. However the attack
still works if two auctions take place in parallel: Since the RA uses the same PKI in
both cases, he will use the same keys. The malicious bidder could register in the second
auction, obtain the signed bid and replace his original bid with this message. The new
message will include a different pseudonym, but the seller has no means of verifying if
a pseudonym corresponds to the current auction. A solution would be to use different
keys for different auctions (which need to be set up in a secure way), but we were unable
to verify the resulting protocol because of some limitations of ProVerif: For example
the counting of messages requires to maintain state information for the RA.
Noninterference: It is clear that the protocol does not ensure Strong Noninterference
(SN) since an attacker can simply count the number of messages to determine the num-
ber of participants. However we can check Weak Noninterference (WN), i.e. that any
two instances containing the same bidders and only differing in the bids are bisimilar
up to the end of the bidding phase, using the following query in ProVerif:
noninterf b 1, ..., b n.
This query will ask ProVerif to verify strong secrecy of the variables b 1, ...,
b n., i.e. to check that any two instances of the protocol that only differ in these vari-
ables are bisimilar. For the original protocol ProVerif finds an attack which is based on
the first message, which includes the hashed bidding price. An attacker simply hashes
the possible values and compares the result. If we encrypt this message using the RA’s
public key, ProVerif is able to prove Weak Noninterference (WN). This modification
was proposed in the original paper to achieve anonymity of bidders, but turns out to be
also necessary to ensure fairness.
15
Highest Price Wins (HPW): Here we have to show that a malicious bidder cannot win
the auction at a chosen price, even if another bidder submitted a higher bid. Again, we
will assume that we have a finite number of possible prices. Then we can check the
property using ProVerif by modeling two bidders, the first one bidding max price, and
the second one is corrupted by the adversary (according to Def. 7). To prevent the ad-
versary from just winning using the highest possible price (which would not necessarily
correspond to an attack), we declare the constant max price private4. We also have to
be sure that the protocol does not leak max price before the end of the bidding phase
(which would contradict the intention of declaring it private). As we already showed
Weak Noninterference (WN), we can be sure that this is not the case. Hence we can
check if the event won is reachable for the corrupted bidder id B using the following
query
query p:price; event(won(p, id B)).
Since bidder id A submitted the highest possible price and the attacker cannot access
and submit this value, he should be unable to make id B win the auction. For the orig-
inal protocol – only corrected with added encryption of the first bid to ensure Weak
Noninterference –, ProVerif finds an attack again using the fact that the messages from
the RA to the Seller are not authenticated, hence an attacker can pretend to be RA and
submit bids of his choice to win the auction at a price of his choice. If we add signatures
again, ProVerif still comes up with an attack: A dishonest bidder might register twice
and then replace the message from the RA to the seller containing the correct bid with
his own, bogus bid obtained using the second registration. As above, this could prob-
ably be circumvented by counting the messages and using different keys for different
auction, but we hit again the limitations of ProVerif when trying to model and verify
the resulting protocol.
Privacy: The authors claim in the original paper that if the first message is encrypted,
their protocol ensures anonymity of the bidders. Yet we can see that it does not en-
sure Strong Anonymity (SA) since after the symmetric key has been published, an at-
tacker can obtain a list with hashes of all bids, which allows to distinguish h(bA), h(bC)
from h(bB), h(bC). Hence we checked Weak Anonymity (WA) using the choice[]
operator in ProVerif, which verifies if the processes obtained by instantiating a vari-
able with two different values are bisimilar. More precisely, we can check if for two
swapping bidders (the first bidder bids b A = choice[b 1,b 2], the second b B
= choice[b 2,b 1]) the resulting processes are bisimilar. This query leads to an-
other possible attack: The intruder might delay the messages from the second bidder.
He waits until the first bidder sent his final message and this was relayed to the seller by
the RA. This allows the attacker to link this message to the first bidder and distinguish
both cases based on the hash after decrypting the message using the published symmet-
ric key. This type of attack is well-known in electronic voting [18]. As a solution, we
have to ensure that both messages to the seller are sent at exactly the same time using
4 In the definition we did not require A to submit the highest possible bid, but only a higher
bid than anybody else. We could model the existence of higher prices by defining additional
private constants, but this would not change the verification task since they are never used by
any honest participants and are not accessible to the attacker.
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synchronization. Inspired by some techniques used in ProSwapper [32], we prove that
the accordingly modified protocol ensures Weak Anonymity (WA).
It is also clear that the protocol is neither Receipt-Free nor Coercion-Resistant for
any of the proposed notions since the hashed bidding price in the first message can be
used as a receipt. Even if this message is encrypted, the data used to encrypt (keys,
random values) can be used as a receipt. Note that for all properties ProVerif responds
in less than a second on a standard PC.
4.2 Protocol by Brandt [3]
The protocol by Brandt [3] was designed to ensure full privacy in a completely dis-
tributed way. It exploits the homomorphic properties of a distributed El-Gamal Encryp-
tion scheme for a secure multi-party computation of the winner.
Informal Description. The participating bidders and the seller communicate using
a bulletin board, i.e. an append-only memory accessible for everybody. The bids are
encoded as bit-vectors where each entry corresponds to a price. The protocol then uses
linear algebra operations on the bid vectors to compute a function fi, which returns a
vector containing one zero if the bidder i submitted the highest bid, and only random
numbers otherwise. To be able to compute this function in a completely distributed
way, and to guarantee that no coalition of malicious bidders can break privacy, these
computations are performed on the encrypted bids using homomorphic properties of a
distributed El-Gamal Encryption.
In a nutshell, the protocol realizes the following steps:
1. Firstly, the distributed key is generated: each bidder chooses his part of the secret
key and publishes the corresponding part of the public key on the bulletin board.
2. Each bidder then computes the joint public key, encrypts his offer using this key
and publishes it on the bulletin board.
3. Then the auction function f is calculated for every bidder using some operations
exploiting the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme.
4. The outcome of this computation (n encrypted values) are published on the bulletin
board, and each bidder partly decrypts each value using his secret key.
5. These shares are posted on the bulletin board, and can be combined to obtain the
result.
Formal Model. Modeling the exchanged messages is straightforward (see [31] for the
ProVerif code). Modeling the distributed encryption scheme and the distributed compu-
tations is a more challenging task since a too abstract model might miss attacks, whereas
a too fine-grained model can lead to non-termination or false attacks.
The protocol assumes a finite set of possible prices, which we will model as con-
stants p 1,...,p n. Assuming q bidders, we can define the following equational the-
ory to model steps 3 and 4 of the protocol:
f(enc(b 1, pkey, r 1), ..., enc(b q, pkey, r q), sk i)
= share((maxi{b i}, argmaxi{b i}), (b 1, ..., b q), pkey, sk i, g(r 1, .., r q))
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This equation models the following properties of the function f: If we have bids b 1,
..., b q encrypted using the same joint public key pkey, some random values r 1,
... ,r q, and a part sk i of the secret key we obtain a share of the function outcome,
i.e. the tuple (winning price, id of the winner), for the same public and secret keys and
a function of the used random values. Since the share will look slightly different de-
pending on the bids even if winning bid is the same, we also include b 1,...,b q in
the share. This is necessary to avoid false attacks in ProVerif. The next equation cor-
responds to step 5 of the protocol and uses the function combine(pk(k 1), ...,
pk(k q)) which models the computation of the joint public key based on the individ-
ual ones.
dec(share(m, x 1, combine(pk(k 1), ..., pk(k q)), k 1, r 1), ...,
share(m, x q, combine(pk(k 1), ..., pk(k q)), k q, r q)) = m
The equation models that knowing all shares of the function outcome allows to decrypt
it, if
– all shares have been constructed using the same joint public key, which was com-
puted using the function combine from the individual public keys, and
– the individual public keys were computed from the same secret keys that were used
to compute the shares.
Since the number of different prices n and the number of participants q are finite, we
can enumerate all possible equations. In particular we can list all possible parameters
of the function f, which allows us to enumerate all instances and replace the max and
argmax functions which their actual values. This yields a convergent equational theory,
which allows ProVerif to verify all the tested properties in less than one second.
Analysis. We use the same ProVerif techniques we discussed in the previous section.
Essentially the protocol ensures none of the defined properties, mainly due the lack of
authentication, even if all parties are trusted. The attacker can simulate a completely
different protocol execution towards the seller (i.e. setting up keys, encrypting bids of
his choice, doing the calculation, and publishing the shares), which allows attacks on
Non-Repudiation (a trace with event won, but without event bid), Non-Cancellation
(a trace with event recBid and event won with a different, lower bid from the same
bidder) and Highest Price Wins (the event wonwith a lower bid from a corrupted bidder
is reachable).
Although the protocol claims to be fully private, ProVerif finds an attack that allows
to completely uncover a bidder’s bid: Since there is no authentication, an intruder can
simulate all other parties with respect to a participant. He will generate secret keys,
publish the according public keys and on reception of the attacked bidder’s bid, simply
copy it and claim that it is his own bid. Then the joint computation and decryption will
take place, and the announced winning price will be attacked bidder’s offer, which is
hence public. Note that this is not an attack on the security of the computation, but on
the structure of the protocol.
It is also clear that the protocol does not ensure Strong Noninterference since the
number of participants is public, which allows to distinguish instances with different
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number of participants. However we prove Weak Noninterference using choice[]
(the use of noninterf leads to false attacks). The ProVerif-code is available in [31].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We provided a framework to formally verify security properties in e-Auction protocols.
In particular we discussed how protocols can be modeled in the Applied pi-Calculus and
how security properties such as different notions of Privacy, Fairness and Authentica-
tion can be expressed. We analyzed the relationship between the different notions and
detailed a hierarchy of privacy notions (Fig. 2).
Using two case studies [3, 6], we showed how our definitions can be applied on
existing protocols and are suitable for automated analysis using ProVerif. The results
were surprising: One of the two protocols provided none of our security notions with-
out modifications, the other protocol only one. It was particularly interesting to see that
even the protocol by Brandt did not ensure privacy, although it was especially designed
with privacy in mind. The discovered flaw is however not an attack on the cryptographic
primitive used, but on the protocol architecture. This underlines again the complexity
of designing secure protocols: A combination of secure building blocks can be inse-
cure. In case of the protocol by Curtis et al. we also subsequently discussed several
modifications to improve security.
As future work, we would like to verify Non-Cancellation and Highest Price Wins
on the modified protocol by Curtis et al., which was not possible directly in ProVerif.
There exist extensions which allow to model states, e.g. StatVerif [33] which might be
used in this case.
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